Capital CommitmentElise Gourier, Ludovic Phalippou, and Mark M. Westerfield [PDF] [Journal Version] [SSRN Version] SummaryWe quantify the capital commitment problem of limited partners in private equity. Investors are willing to pay a significant premium to adjust the quantities committed but not to resolve timing uncertainty. Commitment risk premiums do not disappear even if investments are spread across multiple funds. AbstractTwelve trillion dollars are allocated to private market funds that require outside investors to commit to transferring capital on demand. We show within a novel dynamic portfolio allocation model that ex-ante commitment has large effects on investors’ portfolios and welfare, and we quantify those effects. Investors are underallocated to private market funds and are willing to pay a larger premium to adjust the quantity committed than to eliminate other frictions, like timing uncertainty and limited tradability. Perhaps counterintuitively, commitment risk premiums increase with secondary market liquidity, and they do not disappear when investments are spread over many funds. Cite asGourier, Elise, Ludovic Phalippou, and Mark M. Westerfield. 2024. “Capital Commitment.” Journal of Finance 79(5): 3407–3457. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13382 BibTeX@article{GourierPhalippouWesterfield2024,
author = {Gourier, Elise and Phalippou, Ludovic and Westerfield, Mark M.},
title = {Capital Commitment},
journal = {Journal of Finance},
year = {2024},
volume = {79},
number = {5},
pages = {3407--3457},
doi = {10.1111/jofi.13382},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13382}
}
Updated October 6, 2026. |